|Unsafe client-side session storage leading to authentication bypass/instance takeover via Zabbix Frontend with configured SAML
|In the case of instances where the SAML SSO authentication is enabled (non-default), session data can be modified by a malicious actor, because a user login stored in the session was not verified.
|Known attack vectors
|Malicious unauthenticated actor may exploit this issue to escalate privileges and gain admin access to Zabbix Frontend.
To perform the attack, SAML authentication is required to be enabled and the actor has to know the username of Zabbix user (or use the guest account, which is disabled by default).
|To remediate this vulnerability, apply the updates listed in the 'Fixed Version' section to appropriate products or if an immediate update is not possible, follow the presented below workarounds.
|Zabbix wants to thank Thomas Chauchefoin from SonarSource for reporting this issue to us
|5.4.0 - 5.4.8
|Disable SAML authentication